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PRIOR AND RELATED APPEALS
In Utah Department of Transportation v. Security Investment
Ltd., 2000 UT 97, 17 P.3d 587, the Supreme Court of Utah
consolidated appeals from separate actions by the Utah Department
of Transportation (UDOT) against Security Investment Ltd. (No.
990369) and William K. Olsen (No. 990652), each an appellant in
the present case. The Court held that neither appellant was
entitled to interest from UDOT, the sole appellee, on monies paid
to the clerk of the trial court under Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-1
through -20 (1996 and Supp. 1999) . The Court declined to reach
the issue of whether interest was due from parties not before it
in that appeal, including appellees here.
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Case No. 20010679-SC
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
SECURITY INVESTMENT LTD., a Utah limited partnership, and
WILLIAM K. OLSON, individually and BILL OLSON LTD, a Utah
limited partnership, by William K. Olson, General Partner,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
v.
ALLYSON BROWN, Clerk of the Second Judicial District Court,
Farmington, Utah; The STATE OF UTAH by and through its
state treasurer, WILLIAM T. ALTER; its Administrative Office
of the Courts, DANIEL J. BECKER, Administrator, and
THE STATE OF UTAH, by any officer or agency receiving interest
on funds deposited in courts,
Defendants/Appellees.
Priority No. 15
Appeal from the Findings and Judgment of the
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for
Davis County, State of Utah,
Honorable Rodney S. Page
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiffs filed the complaint in this action in the Second
Judicial District Court in December, 2000 (R. 1-7) under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and certain provisions of state law.

They claimed

that defendants had taken their property in violation of their
constitutional rights by refusing to pay interest on funds
deposited with the court by the Utah Department of Transportation
(UDOT) pursuant to a state statute governing eminent domain
proceedings.

Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R. 14-16) for failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted.

After an exchange of

memoranda (R. 17-104) x and a hearing (R. 109), the court granted
the motion (R. 110-22) and entered findings and judgment in
defendants1 favor dated August 3, 2001 and filed August 6, 2001
(R. 126-29).

Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal on

August 17, 2001 (R. 130-31).

This Court has jurisdiction over

the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 2001) as a
case not within the original appellate jurisdiction of the Utah
Court of Appeals.

ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL
1.

The district court correctly concluded that plaintiffs

failed to establish a right to interest from defendants on monies
deposited with the court pursuant to eminent domain proceedings.
2.

The district court's unchallenged, dispositive

rulings--that defendants are variously entitled to absolute
quasi-judicial immunity, qualified immunity, and immunity as nonpersons under § 1983, and are not affirmatively linked to
plaintiffs' alleged harm--preclude reversal of its dismissal of
the federal claims.
3.

The district court correctly concluded that its

jurisdiction was not properly invoked over plaintiffs' state law

!

In paginating the record for appeal, the district court
clerk appears to have used page numbers 103 and 104 twice:
first, for the last two pages of attachments to defendants' reply
memorandum, and second, for the first two pages of their notice
to submit for decision. The first use is referenced here.
2

claims due to their failure to file a timely notice of claim
under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Standard of Review:

"Because the propriety of a dismissal

under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a question of law,
we give the trial court's ruling no deference and review it under
a correctness standard."

Warner v. DMG Color, Inc.. 2000 UT 102,

1|6, 20 P.3d 868.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes,
and rules pertinent to the issues before the Court is contained
in the body of this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition
Below
Plaintiffs filed the complaint in this action on December

14, 2000 (R. 1-7).

The complaint alleged that in prior eminent

domain proceedings relating to plaintiffs' property, the district
court clerk, at the direction of the Administrative Office of the
Courts, improperly refused, in the absence of a court order, to
authorize payment of interest to plaintiffs on funds deposited
with the court under the eminent domain statute.

Plaintiffs

alleged that this refusal constitutes an unlawful taking under
the Utah and federal constitutions and sought accrued interest on
the deposited sums, interest upon interest, unspecified damages

3

for the violation of their civil rights, and attorney fees and
costs.
Defendants responded by moving for dismissal under Utah R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (R. 14-16) on the ground that plaintiffs had
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, arguing
that (1) plaintiffs' claim to interest is barred by collateral
estoppel, (2) defendants are not persons subject to suit under
§ 1983, (3) there is no affirmative link between the actions of
defendants and plaintiffs' alleged injury, (4) defendants have
quasi-judicial and/or qualified immunity from suit, and (5) the
suit is jurisdictionally defective as to the state law claims for
plaintiffs' failure to file a notice of claim as required by the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act (R. 17-69).

Plaintiffs opposed

the motion in a memorandum (R. 70-86), arguing unsuccessfully
that (1) collateral estoppel does not apply because the issue in
the present case differs from the issue addressed in the prior
litigation cited by defendants, (2) defendants can be sued under
§ 1983 for prospective relief from the continuing deprivation of
interest, (3) the Utah Governmental Immunity Act waives immunity
for recovery of just compensation, and (4) the claims for
interest as a part of just compensation are not subject to the
notice and other requirements of the immunity act.

Plaintiffs

further asserted that on February 7, 2001 (subsequent to the
filing of the present suit), they cured any defect in notice by
providing defendants "additional notice" (R. 78).

4

After defendants replied (R. 87-104), 2 the court held a
hearing (see R. 109) and subsequently ruled in defendants' favor
(R. 110-22) .

Treating the deposited funds as trust funds under

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-4 (1996) and Rule 3-407 of the Utah Rules
of Judicial Administration, the court held that because
plaintiffs had not followed the proper procedure under the rule
to request the deposit of the funds in an interest-bearing escrow
account and had shown neither the statute nor the rule to be
unconstitutional, they failed to establish a property right in
the interest that could sustain their claim of an
unconstitutional taking.

Moreover, the court found no

affirmative link between the alleged deprivation and defendants'
conduct.

The court further held defendants immune from liability

on the basis that they acted "within the scope of their office"
(R. 117) in denying payment of interest to which plaintiffs had
established no right.

Finally, the court determined that

plaintiffs' failure to file a timely notice of claim could not be
retroactively cured, and jurisdiction was therefore not properly
invoked as to claims arising under state law.
not to reach the issue of collateral estoppel.

The court elected
Findings and

judgment were subsequently entered (R. 126-29), and plaintiffs
appealed (R. 130-31).

2

See n.1, supra.
5

B.

Statement of Relevant Facts
Because plaintiffs raise only issues of law in their appeal

(see Aplt. Brief at 2-3), the relevant facts are drawn from the
court's Ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (R. 110-22).
In 1997, the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) filed
separate condemnation actions against plaintiffs Security
Investment and William K. Olsen in state district court.

In

conformance with state statute, UDOT also moved for immediate
occupancy and deposited monies in the amounts of the estimated
values of the condemned properties with the court clerk.

Neither

the court nor any party requested that the funds be placed in an
interest-bearing escrow account pursuant to Rule 3-407 of the
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration.

All deposited funds were

released to plaintiffs in 1999, when the court made a final
determination of plaintiffs' entitlement to them.

The

disbursement was ordered without prejudice to any subsequent
action for interest accrued on the monies while they were on
deposit with the clerk.

The clerk declined to pay plaintiffs

interest on the deposited sums pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-4 (1996) and Rule 3-407(3)(F) on the ground that absent a
request pursuant to the rule, the accrued interest defaulted to a
restricted account to be used for identified state purposes under
the statute.

Plaintiffs appealed the issue to the Supreme Court

of Utah, which affirmed the district court's rulings but declined
to determine whether non-parties to the underlying actions,
including the court clerk, would be obligated to pay interest as

6

requested by plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs then brought the present

suit against a new set of defendants.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs acknowledge that two provisions of the Utah Code
are determinative of their rights in this case, one which governs
the deposit of monies with a court in condemnation actions and
one which governs a court's treatment of funds it receives in
trust.

Under either statute, the result is the same:

plaintiffs

are not entitled to the interest they seek on the funds held by
the court.

Because property interests are created by state law,

and no property interest exists in plaintiffs under the statutes
they identify as controlling, the court correctly held that
plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a property interest that is
subject to protection under the federal constitution.

Plaintiffs

fail to show error in this determination, relying on cases that
are readily distinguishable on their facts from the circumstances
of the present action.

Absent a constitutionally protected

right, plaintiffs' § 1983 claims are groundless.
Moreover, plaintiffs have failed to challenge defendants'
immunity from suit as determined by the district court.
Plaintiffs do not deny that, under § 1983, the state, its
agencies, and its officers in their official capacities are
immune from claims for damages as non-persons.

Nor have they

challenged the court's rulings that the individual defendants are
variously entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity and
7

qualified immunity for their acts.

These unchallenged rulings

stand as independent grounds sustaining the dismissal of
plaintiffs1 federal claims and nullifying the effect of any
possible success plaintiffs might otherwise achieve on the
substance of those claims.
Plaintiffs' argument that governmental immunity does not
apply to state constitutional or statutory causes of action
cannot be credited.

Plaintiffs do no more than list the

citations to five Utah Supreme Court cases decided from 1977 to
1990, with no examination of their facts or underlying legal
principles.

Recent precedent makes clear that the procedural

requirements for filing of a notice of claim apply to all claims
for damages against the state under state law.

As the district

court correctly held, plaintiffs' default of notice precludes
relief on their causes of action under state law.
Plaintiffs attempt to incorporate by reference certain
arguments they represent as advanced in a previous appeal of a
different case by plaintiff Olsen.

However, plaintiffs failed to

raise these arguments, attacking the applicability of Utah R.
Jud. Admin. 3-407 to condemnation deposits, before the district
court in the present case.

Because they are raised in the case

at bar for the first time on appeal, the arguments are waived for
purposes of this Court's review.

Moreover, even if the Court

were to consider them, they are without merit.

8

For these reasons, as more fully explained below, the
decision of the district court is entitled to this Court's
affirmance.

ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO CHALLENGE THE DISPOSITIVE
DETERMINATIONS OF THE DISTRICT COURT REGARDING THEIR
FEDERAL CLAIMS.
In its Findings and Judgment (R. 126-29), the trial court
made the following determinations:
1.

The State of Utah and the Administrative Office of
the Courts, and defendants Brown, Alter and Becker
in their official capacities, are not "persons"
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

2.

Plaintiffs have failed to establish the requisite
affirmative causal link between the actions of
defendants and plaintiffs' alleged injuries.

3.

Plaintiffs did not perfect a property right in the
UDOT interest funds at issue. Having no property
right, there was no unconstitutional taking of
plaintiffs' property, and therefore no violation
of plaintiffs' constitutional rights.

4.

Defendants Brown and Becker are entitled to quasijudicial and qualified immunity.

5.

Defendant Alter is entitled to qualified immunity.

6.

The Court's jurisdiction was not properly invoked
pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

Findings and Judgment, R. 127.

Dismissal was ordered pursuant to

these multiple grounds.
Of the five separate, dispositive shortcomings on which the
court based its dismissal of the federal claims, plaintiffs
attack only the third.

With respect to defendants' immunity as

non-persons under § 1983, as articulated in the court's ruling
9

(R. 115), plaintiffs1 brief is silent.

It is likewise silent as

to the court's determination that plaintiffs have shown no
affirmative link between defendants1 actions and plaintiffs1
alleged harm (see Ruling at R. 115-16).

Nor does plaintiffs1

brief address the court's grant of absolute quasi-judicial and
qualified immunity for defendants Brown and Becker, and qualified
immunity for defendant Alter (see Ruling at R. 116-18).

These

four rulings are, by themselves, sufficient grounds on which to
sustain the court's dismissal of plaintiffs' federal claims.
Under the jurisprudence of Utah's appellate courts,
" [i]ssues not briefed by an appellant are deemed waived and
abandoned."

American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mech., Inc., 93 0

P.2d 1182, 1185 n.5 (Utah 1996); see also Pasquin v. Pasquin,
1999 UT App 245, ^21, 988 P.2d 1 (quoting American Towers).
Further, pointing out these omissions in a response does not
permit plaintiffs to cure them in their reply brief.

See State

v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, 1(21, 6 P.3d 1116 (where state observed
that appellant had failed to raise issues in his opening
brief, " [t]hat observation by the State did not constitute a 'new
matter' entitling [appellant] to brief the issue in his reply
brief").
Even if plaintiffs were to succeed on the merits of the
issues their brief addresses, the dispositive nature of the
unchallenged determinations regarding defendants' non-person
status, quasi-judicial and qualified immunity, and lack of an
affirmative link to plaintiffs' alleged harm would render
10

plaintiffs1 victory ineffective to alter the result of dismissal.
Because they have failed to dispute these dispositive
determinations, the dismissal of their federal claims warrants
affirmance here.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED
THAT PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED PROPERTY RIGHT TO INTEREST ON FUNDS
DEPOSITED WITH THE COURT.
"While the Constitution guarantees due process before the
deprivation of property interests, such interests are not created
by the Constitution.

Rather, property interests 'are created and

their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings
that stem from an independent source such as state law.'"

Lucas

v. Murray City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 949 P.2d 746, 752 (Utah App.
1997) (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972)).

The gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint here is an

alleged entitlement to interest "as part of just compensation"
(Aplt. Brief at 10-21) on the monies deposited with the court by
UDOT in a separate eminent domain action.

However, plaintiffs

have failed to show error in the trial court's determination that
the controlling provisions of law do not give them a property
interest in the monies to which they lay claim.
In asserting they are owed interest on the deposited funds
as an element of just compensation (see Aplt. Brief at 17-21),
plaintiffs identifyvUtah Code Ann. § 78-34-9 (1996)3 as a
3

In the Addenda to their brief, plaintiffs set out the
statute as it appeared before it was rewritten effective May 4,
1998. The substance of the statute relevant to the issues before
the Court has not changed. Moreover, UDOT's deposit of funds was
11

provision determinative of their claim (see Aplt. Brief at 3 ) .
Section 78-34-9 provides, with respect to deposited funds, that
[t]he rights of just compensation for the land so taken
or damaged [by condemnation] shall vest in the parties
entitled thereto, and said compensation shall be
ascertained and awarded as provided in Section 78-34-10
and established by judgment therein, and the said
judgment shall include, as part of the just
compensation awarded, interest at the rate of 8% per
annum on the amount finally awarded as the value of the
property and damages, from the date of taking actual
possession thereof by the plaintiff or order of
occupancy, whichever is earlier, to the date of

judgment; but interest shall not be allowed on so much
thereof
as shall have been paid into
court.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9 (1996) (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs

have neither attacked the constitutionality of this statute nor
offered an interpretation of the language explicitly denying
interest on funds deposited in compliance with the statutory
provisions.

Under the statute's plain language, plaintiffs have

no right to interest on the amount of the UDOT deposit as a part
of just compensation.

Their acknowledgment of the statute as

determinative effectively establishes that the state has not
granted them a property right in the interest they claim.
Plaintiffs, while conceding the determinative nature of
section 78-34-9 (see Aplt. Brief at 3 ) , attempt to circumvent
this result by ignoring relevant statutory language.

Their

quotation of the statute is truncated, omitting without
explanation the language that exempts deposits with the court
from statutory interest.

See Aplt. Brief at 11.

made under the pre-1998 version of the statute.
references will be made to the earlier version.
12

The omitted

Therefore, all

statutory language makes clear that no interest is owed on the
amount UDOT deposited with the court in the underlying
condemnation action.

Plaintiffs have simply ignored this

statutory exemption, offering no reasoned argument why it should
not be applied to them.

Their failure to challenge the plain

meaning of the statute is, by itself, a sufficient ground for
affirmance of the district court's decision.
An appellate court "may affirm the trial court's ruling on
any proper ground as long as there is evidence in the record
supporting such an affirmance."

State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145,

149 (Utah App. 1997); see also Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas.
and Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127, 132 (Utah 1997).

Here, there is

evidence before the Court in the form of plaintiffs' own
complaint that UDOT deposited funds with the trial court pursuant
to section 78-34-9 (R. 2, f 6 and R. 3, 1 9) and that the court
ordered the full amount of the deposit paid over to plaintiffs
(R. 2-3, H 6 and R. 4, % 10).

Plaintiffs have raised no

challenge to the constitutionality of section 78-34-9.

As the

Supreme Court of Utah has recognized,
legislative enactments are endowed with a strong
presumption of validity and will not be declared
unconstitutional unless there is no real basis upon
which they can be construed as conforming to
constitutional requirements. We have at times held
this to be true even in cases where this court must
engage in "reconstructive surgery" in order to uphold a
statute.
State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, ^28, 996 P.2d 546 (citation
omitted); see also Warren v. Melville, 937 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah
App. 1997) ("A statute, however, carries a strong presumption of
13

constitutionality, with doubts resolved in favor of its
constitutionality").

Because the statute is presumptively

constitutional, and because payment in full under the statute was
made to them, plaintiffs have no property right in additional
monies as a part of just compensation.

Although the district

court reached this result on other grounds, the record amply
supports affirmance of its decision for the reason that, absent a
state-created property right, plaintiffs have no cause of action
under § 1983, and those claims were correctly dismissed.
The district court ruled that the UDOT deposits were
properly treated under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-4
(1996) and Utah R. Jud. Admin. 3-407 (3)(F), observing that
plaintiffs failed to cite any case law supporting their argument
that either provision is unconstitutional (R. 116). Plaintiffs1
appellate brief is likewise devoid of citation to precedent on
point.

While plaintiffs cite to numerous Supreme Court opinions,

each one is readily distinguishable from the circumstances of the
present case.
Plaintiffs' primary argument is taken virtually verbatim
from the response they filed to defendants1 motion to dismiss
below (see R. 71-73) .

It cites two Supreme Court cases for the

proposition that interest is due on deposited funds.

In Webb's

Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980), an
interpleader action, the funds at issue were tendered to the
court clerk, who deposited them in an interest-bearing account
and deducted over $9,000.00 as his fee pursuant to statute.
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The

funds were ultimately turned over to a receiver, less the
statutory fee and over $90,000.00 in accumulated interest.

The

Supreme Court, emphasizing the limited scope of its holding,
stated
that under the narrow circumstances of this case--where
there is a separate and distinct state statute
authorizing a clerk's fee "for services rendered" based
upon the amount of principal deposited; where the
deposited fund itself concededly is private; and where
the deposit in the court's registry is required by
state statute in order for the depositor to avail
itself of statutory protection from claims of creditors
and others--Seminole County's taking unto itself the
interest earned on the interpleader fund while it was
in the registry of the court was a taking violative of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. We express
no

view as to the constitutionality
of a statute
that
prescribes
a county's retention
of interest
earned,
where the interest
would be the only return to the
county for services it
renders.
449 U.S. at 164-65 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs cite this passage in their brief

(see Aplt. Brief at

14), but make no attempt to show how they fit within the
holding's narrow scope.

The circumstances of the case at bar are

precisely those as to which the court explicitly declined to
rule:

where the court's retention of interest is the only return

it receives for its services.

Nothing in the record suggests

that the district court in the present case applied any service
fee to the UDOT deposits.

Consequently, Webb's Fabulous

Pharmacies does nothing to advance plaintiffs' claims.
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156
(1998), is equally unhelpful to plaintiffs.

The case concerned

interest on short-term client deposits of private funds held in
15

trust by attorneys in interest-bearing IOLTA accounts.
Phillips court observed that "[ujnlike in Webb's,

The

where the State

safeguarded and invested the deposited funds, funds held in IOLTA
accounts are managed entirely by banks and private attorneys."
Phillips, 524 U.S. at 171.

In fact, it observed that "[t]his

would be a different case if the interest income generated by
IOLTA accounts was transferred to the State as payment 'for
services rendered1 by the State.

Our holding does not prohibit a

State from imposing reasonable fees it incurs in generating and
allocating interest income."

Id. (citation omitted).

In light

of this court-drawn distinction, Phillips does not apply to
court-deposited funds on which interest is retained by the state
in lieu of other fees.

To the extent that plaintiffs suggest

otherwise, they misapprehend its holding.
Plaintiffs1 citations to other supreme court cases are even
less compelling and appear to focus less on section 78-27-4 than
on the condemnation statute itself.

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,

121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001), an inverse condemnation action, has no
bearing on the issues in this case, but simply cites Webbf s
Fabulous Pharmacies for the unremarkable proposition that a state
may not transform private to public property simply by declaring
it so (121 S. Ct. at 2463) .

In United States v. Rogers, 255 U.S.

163 (1921), and Seaboard Air Line Railway Co. v. United States,
261 U.S. 299 (1923), the federal government was required to pay
interest on the value of condemned land from the time of its
entry on the land until the time the amount of the award was
16

deposited for the owners1 use.

By contrast, in the case at bar,

section 78-34-9 requires the deposit of condemnation funds "as a
condition precedent to occupancy."
(1996).

Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9

There is no evidence of record to suggest that

plaintiffs' land was occupied by UDOT prior to its deposit of
funds with the courts.

Finally, in United States v. Worlev, 281

U.S. 339 (1930), the court disallowed interest on monthly
installments of insurance benefits.

The court's reference, in

dictum, to Seaboard as holding that taking private property for
public use includes an implied agreement to pay interest (281
U.S. at 341-42) has no bearing on the issues before this Court,
especially in light of the prior determination by the Supreme
Court of Utah in the underlying condemnation action that UDOT
could not be held liable for post-deposit interest.

See Utah

Dep't of Transp. v. Security Inv. Ltd., 2000 UT 97, 17 P.3d 587.
Plaintiffs' citation to Sieael v. Salt Lake County
Cottonwood Sanitary District, 655 P.2d 662 (Utah 1982), is
inapposite to the circumstances present here (see Aplt. Brief at
18).

In Sieael, the defendant did not make a deposit of funds

with the court prior to entering on the plaintiff's property.
There is no question that the statute requires interest on
condemnation awards where no funds have been deposited with the
court.

That is not the fact in this case.

Because plaintiffs have shown no property right to interest
on the UDOT deposit under the condemnation statute, their attempt
to remove the funds from the operation of Utah Code Ann.
17

§ 78-27-4 (1996) and Utah R. Jud. Admin. 3-407 is unavailing.
If, as they claim, section 78-27-4 cannot deprive them of just
compensation including statutorily mandated interest (see Aplt.
Brief at 19), then, as they acknowledge, section 78-34-9 governs.
But that provision denies interest on the amount of the deposit,
as explained above.

Plaintiffs may not like the result, but they

cannot avoid it by means of their circular argument.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
PLAINTIFFS' FAILURE TO FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM LEFT IT
WITHOUT JURISDICTION OVER THEIR STATE LAW CAUSES OF
ACTION.
In addition to their federal claims, plaintiffs assert
causes of action based on state law.

Under the Utah Governmental

Immunity Act,
Any person having a claim for injury against a
governmental entity, or against its employee for an act
or omission occurring during the performance of the
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or
under color of authority shall file a written notice of
claim with the entity before maintaining an action,
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise
to the claim is characterized as governmental.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2) (Supp. 2001).

Under Utah Code Ann.

§ 63-30-12 (Supp. 2001), the notice must be "filed with the
attorney general within one year after the claim arises, or
before the expiration of any extension of time granted" under the
prior section.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-14 (1997) gives the

governmental entity ta period of ninety days in which to act on
the claim, which is deemed denied if no action has been taken at
the end of the period.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15 (1997)

authorizes suits by claimants whose actions are denied or deemed
18

denied within one year of the denial or, in the case of deemed
denials, the expiration of the denial period.

These procedural

requisites apply to all claims against state entities for injury,
which is broadly defined as "death, injury to a person, damage to
or loss of property, or any other injury that a person may suffer
to his person, or estate, that would be actionable if inflicted
by a private person or his agent."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(5)

(Supp. 2001). 4
There is no question that the harm plaintiffs allege to
their property interests is injury as the statute defines it.

As

a consequence, plaintiffs were required to provide a timely
notice of claim in order for the court to have jurisdiction over
their state law claims.

The trial court ruled that because

strict compliance with the notice provision is required,
plaintiffs1 failure to file a timely notice of claim deprived it
of jurisdiction over those claims (R. 120).
The only notice of claim to which plaintiffs refer in the
record is dated February 7, 2001 (see Aplt. Brief at 23), nearly
two months after the complaint in this action was filed.

While

it was characterized as "additional notice" (id.), plaintiffs
identify no earlier notice that complies with the statute.

As

the Supreme Court of Utah held recently in Hall v. State
Department of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, ^22, 24 P.3d 958, "[t]he
Governmental Immunity Act clearly requires that where the state

4

Changes to the statute effective May 1, 2000, did not alter
this subsection of the statute.
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may be sued--such as under the Whistleblower Act--potential
plaintiffs must provide a formal

!

notice of claim1 to the

appropriate governmental official before bringing their action."
In Hall, even a notice of claim filed contemporaneously with the
initiation of suit was inadequate to confer jurisdiction on the
district court.

As the Hall court further observed, "We have

also held that the Governmental Immunity Act's notice of claim
requirement is not subject to exception, even if the governmental
entity at issue has effective notice of the claim."

Id. at 1|25.

Plaintiffs' argument on this issue is contained in Point III
of their brief, a bare listing of citations to five pre-HalJL
cases, with no explanation of their significance.

Under Utah R.

App. P. 24(a)(9), " [t]he argument shall contain the contentions
and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not
preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities,
statutes, and parts of the record relied on."

Plaintiffs' naked

citations do not fulfill the requirements of the rule.

"This

court has clearly stated that "'[a] reviewing court is entitled
to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited
and is not simply a depository in which [a party] may dump the
burden of argument and research.'"

Ellis v. Swensen, 2 000 UT

101, 1l7, 16 P.3d 1233 (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,
450 (Utah 1988) (quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 92 111. App. 3d
1087, 1089, 48 111. Dec. 510, 511, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (1981))).
Moreover, "Utah courts routinely decline to consider inadequately
20

briefed arguments."

State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah

App. 1998).
Sidestepping direct confrontation with the notice issue,
Plaintiffs insist that they are properly before the court because
article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution is self-executing.
This argument misses the point.

The Hall court made clear that

even under circumstances in which the substantive protections of
the immunity act do not apply, the procedural requirements of
timely notice must still be followed.

Hall, 2001 UT 34, ij21.

Plaintiffs do not provide any reasoned analysis for exempting
state constitutional claims from this requirement.

As the

Supreme Court of Utah observed in deciding a claim under the
state constitution's "unnecessary rigor" clause, "'[A]ny rule or
regulation in regard to the remedy [for a constitutional
violation] which does not, under pretense of modifying or
regulating it, take away or impair the right itself, cannot be
regarded as beyond the proper province of legislation.'"

Bott v.

DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 736 (Utah 1996) (quoting 2 Thomas M.
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 756 (1927) (alteration in
original)).

The court further acknowledged that " [a]11

constitutional rights, including the highly protected right of
free speech, are subject to reasonable regulation."

Bott, 922

P.2d at 743.5
5

The Tenth Circuit has held, based on the Bott decision,
that dismissal of state constitutional claims with prejudice is
mandatory absent strict compliance with the procedural requisites
of notice. See Jensen v. Reeves, 3 Fed. Appx. 905, 2001 WL
113829 (10th Cir. 2001) . The Tenth Circuit upheld the district
21

Plaintiffs' invocation of Webber v. Salt Lake City, 40 Utah
221, 120 P. 503 (1911), does not change this result (see Aplt.
Brief at 16-17).

The issue in Webber was "whether the liability

[for a taking of real property] set forth in this action is one
created by statute."

Webber, 120 P. at 504.

There is no

question in the case at bar of whether liability for a
condemnation is created by constitution or by statute.

Rather,

the question is squarely one of reasonable regulation that does
not impair the constitutional right to a remedy for a taking of
real property, an issue that Webber does not address.
Plaintiffs' reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10.5 (1997)
is likewise misplaced.

While that statute does, as plaintiffs

suggest, waive the state's immunity for the taking of private
property without compensation, it does not absolve plaintiffs of
compliance with the notice provisions of the immunity act.

One

need look no further than the subsequent section to see that
where the legislature intended a waiver of immunity to alter or
excuse notice, it said so expressly; section 63-30-10.6, waiving

court's conclusion "that Bo tt could not reasonably be read for
the proposition that none of the provisions of the [Utah
Governmental Immunity] Act, including its purely procedural
requirements, apply to claims arising under the Utah
Constitution. Instead, relying on the plain language of the Act,
the district court concluded that the Act's notice-of-claim
provisions applied to all claims against a governmental entity
and its employees."4 Jensen, 3 Fed. Appx. at *911, 2001 WL 113829
at *6.
This decision was not selected for publication by the Tenth
Circuit. However, 10th Cir. R. 36.3 allows citation of its
unpublished opinions which are persuasive on material issues not
addressed in a published opinion. A copy of the decision is
attached to this brief as Addendum A.
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immunity for attorney fees in records requests made under
statute, states that "a notice of claim for attorneys* fees under
Subsection (1) may be filed contemporaneously with a petition for
review under Section 63-2-404 . . .!l . Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-10.6(1)(a) (1997).

See also Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5(1)

(1997), waiving notice as to contractual rights or obligations
("Actions arising out of contractual rights or obligations shall
not be subject to the requirements of Sections 63-30-11,
63-30-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19»).
In light of these express, statutory exemptions from notice
and of the precedential holdings of Bott and Hall, it cannot
reasonably be questioned that plaintiffs here were required to
file a timely notice of claim in order to go forward with their
state law causes of action, including the claim made under
article I, section 22.

Further, under Hall, their failure to do

so could not be cured by providing notice after the initiation of
their lawsuit.

For these reasons, there are no grounds to

support reversal of the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs1
state law claims.
IV. SECTION 78-27-4 AND RULE 3-4 07 DO NOT DEPRIVE
PLAINTIFFS OF A REMEDY TO WHICH STATE LAW ENTITLES
THEM.
Even if the court had jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state
law claims, there is no merit to the arguments they raise in
support of the allegedly unlawful taking of their property
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-4 (1996) and Utah R. Jud.
Admin. 3-407.

Plaintiffs attempt to resurrect these arguments
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from "a previous appeal by Olsen in Supreme Court No. 990652SC"
(Aplt. Brief at 25), the separate condemnation action brought by
UDOT.

Because these arguments were not presented to the district

court in the present action, they are consequently not properly
raised here.

In the words of this Court, " [a]s we have

reiterated many times, we will not consider an issue raised on
appeal for the first time."

Shire Dev. v. Frontier Invs., 799

P.2d 221, 224 (Utah App. 1990).

Even if the arguments are

considered, however, they are unavailing.
Section 78-27-4 governs all money deposited in court to be
held in trust.

Plaintiffs attempt to avoid the application of

the statute and its related rule by asserting "that the money
deposited with the Clerk in these eminent domain proceedings was
for just compensation and was never public money or trust funds"
(Aplt. Brief at 14). However, nothing in section 78-27-4
restricts the definition of money deposits with the court to
public funds or funds already identifiable as "trust funds" or
precludes the inclusion of monies deposited pursuant to other
statutes.

The statute simply provides a mechanism for treatment

of all monetary deposits held for the use of others.

Plaintiffs

fail to show that the funds held by the trial court were not
being "held in trust" under the plain meaning of the statute.
Indeed, having beenvawarded the full amount of the UDOT deposit,
they cannot show that the UDOT money, when paid to the court
clerk, was not being held "in trust" for their eventual use.
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Plaintiffs correctly recount the language of Rule 3-407fs
definition of "trust accounts" but incorrectly interpret its
application.

accounts

Under Rule 3-407(3) (A), "[t] rust accounts are

established

by the courts

parties" (emphasis added).

for the benefit of third

The rule merely implements the

statute's dictate by creating trust accounts from the monies
deposited for the use of others pursuant to section 78-27-4.
Under Rule 3-407(3)(F), all such deposits are to be placed in
interest-bearing accounts.

Part (3)(F)(ii) governs amounts, such

as the amounts of the UDOT deposits at issue here, in excess of
$5,000.00.

With respect to such amounts, "the court may order or

the litigant may request that such funds be deposited in an
interest bearing escrow account."
3-407(3)(F)(ii).

Utah R. Jud. Admin.

Further,

For interest bearing accounts established at the
request of the litigant or by court order, an
administrative fee, in an amount established by the
Council, shall be assessed. The account shall be
maintained in the name of the court, and the State tax
identification number shall be used. The court shall,
in all orders providing for the withdrawal of trust
funds, designate the person or entity to whom the
earned interest is awarded.
Utah R. Jud. Admin. 3-407(3)(F)(iii).

This procedure comports in

substance with Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, providing the court an
administrative fee while allowing it to designate the party
entitled to the accrued interest.

The statute makes unambiguous

provision for a party to protect any right to interest simply by
requesting the amount of principal to be placed in an interest-
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bearing escrow account pursuant to the rule--an action plaintiffs
here undisputedly failed to take.
On appeal, plaintiffs make two arguments with regard to
section 78-27-4 and Rule 3-407.

First, they attempt to

distinguish eminent domain deposits from the examples the rule
provides of deposits subject to its procedures:

"Examples of

funds which are held in trust accounts include restitution, child
support, and bail amounts."

Utah R. Jud. Admin. 3-407(3) (A).

They contend that the identified examples are, unlike
condemnation deposits, "non-mandated funds . . . which can be
ordered by the court but which are not mandated by law" (Aplt.
Brief at 27) .

This argument fails for two reasons.

As a primary

consideration, the argument was never raised in the trial court
and has therefore been waived for purposes of appeal.
Dev., 799 P.2d at 224.

See Shire

In addition, plaintiffs' attempted

distinction is a false one.
permissive, not mandatory:

The operation of section 78-34-9 is
"The plaintiff may move the court or

a judge thereof, at any time after the commencement of suit," for
an order of immediate occupancy.
(1996).

Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9

Not until such motion is made is the court mandated to

require a deposit of funds as a condition of granting occupancy.
Similarly, a criminal defendant may or may not seek immediate
release from confinement.

However, if he does, the court is

mandated to set a reasonable bail, absent limited statutory
exceptions.
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Plaintiffs' second argument against the application of the
statute and its related rule is that because the takings clause
of the state constitution has been held to be self-executing,
plaintiffs' entitlement to interest cannot be diminished by a
statute requiring plaintiffs to "perfect" their interest
procedurally.

Defendants do not deny that the takings clause is

self-executing.

However, section 78-27-4 and Rule 3-407 do not

address the substance of the takings clause.

Nor do they deny

plaintiffs any remedy to which they may be entitled.

They merely

establish reasonable regulations--the kind of regulations,
permitted under Bott, which do not impair any constitutional
interest plaintiffs may possess--for the handling of money that
the court is obligated to retain, from whatever sources, prior to
distribution by court order.

What plaintiffs are really

challenging here is the failure of the district court judge to
order the payment of interest, not defendants' compliance with
the terms of the order.
battle and lost.

Plaintiffs have already fought that

See Utah Pep' t of Transp. v. Security Inv.

Ltd., 2000 UT 97, 17 P.3d 587.
Finally, plaintiffs contend on appeal that Rule 3-407 is
fatally defective because civil fees cannot be set by the
Judicial Council (see Aplt. Brief at 30), because the rates
established by the Judicial Council pursuant to the rule are
excessive (see Aplt. Brief at 30-31), and because public policy
requires that a trustee of public funds protect the assets of the
"true beneficiary" (Aplt. Brief at 32). None of these arguments
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was raised in the district court; each is therefore improperly
advanced on appeal and not appropriate to this Court's
deliberations.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs have failed to contest findings of the district
court that are dispositive of their federal claims, leaving their
argument as to the merits of those claims wholly without effect.
They have conceded that their notice of claim was filed only
after they initiated the present lawsuit, a procedural flaw which
the district court correctly held deprived it of jurisdiction
over their state law claims.

Even if this Court were to reach

the merits of plaintiffs' various causes of action, plaintiffs
have failed to provide a reasoned basis for reversal of the
district court's dismissal, as more fully explained above.
Defendants therefore respectfully seek this Court's affirmance of
the district court's decision dismissing this case.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION
Defendants believe this case presents no factual or legal
complexities that necessitate oral argument.

However, defendants

wish to participate if argument is ordered by the Court.

As no

published Utah precedent explicitly addresses the application of
notice-of-claim requirements under the Governmental Immunity Act
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to state constitutional causes of action, defendants believe
publication of the Court's decision is warranted.

DATED this

day of November, 2001.

^Lj=fA

NANCY L. KEMP
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees
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3 Fed.Appx. 905
153 Ed. Law Rep. 496, 2001 CJ C.A.R. 794
(Cite as: 3 Fed.Appx. 905, 2001 WL 113829 (10th Ci .(Utah)))
Not selected for publication in the Federal Reporter.
This opinion was not selected for publication in the
Federal Reporter. Please use FIND to look at the
applicable circuit court rule before citing this
opinion. FI CTA10 Rule 36.3.
United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.
Carl JENSEN and Judy Jensen, for themselves
individually, and on behalf of
their children, C.J., AMJ and ABJ, PlaintiffsAppellants,
v.
Muffet REEVES, in her official and individual
capacity; Alpine School
District; Tom Rabb, in his official and individual
capacity; Roy Pehrson, in
his official and individual capacity; and Kent
Pierce, in his official
capacity, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 99-4142.
Feb. 9, 2001.
Parents of elementary school student, who had been
suspended for misconduct, brought § 1983 action
against school officials. The United States District
Court for the District of Utah, Dee Benson, Chief
Judge, 45 F.Supp.2d 1265, dismissed the complaint
in its entirety, and plaintiffs appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Murphy, Circuit Judge, held that: (1)
contemporaneous disclosure to the parents of a
victimized child of the results of any investigation
and resulting disciplinary actions taken against an
alleged child perpetrator does not constitute a release
of an "education record" within the meaning of the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(FERPA); (2) memoranda sent to other parents did
not disclose anything that could qualify as an
"education record"; (3) the district court did not
abuse its discretion in exercising pendent
jurisdiction; and (4) notice-of-claims provisions of
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act apply to all
claims, including claims based on violation of the
Utah Constitution.
Affirmed.

West Headnotes
[1] Records <®^>31
326k31
Contemporaneous disclosure to the parents of a
victimized child of the results of any investigation
and resulting disciplinary actions taken against an
alleged child perpetrator does not constitute a release
of an "education record" within the meaning of the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(FERPA). General Education Provisions Act, §
444(a)(4)(A), as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. §
1232g(a)(4)(A).
[2] Records <®^31
326k31
Memoranda sent by school to parents of students
who claimed they had been hit or touched by
plaintiffs' child, or who had reported or were
witnesses to that conduct, did not disclose anything
that could qualify as an "education record" under the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(FERPA), where the memoranda reflected only the
following information: (1) an incident allegedly
occurred on the playground involving plaintiffs'
child and a number of others; (2) plaintiffs' child
was allegedly verbally and/or physically abusive to
several children during the incident; (3) each
addressee's child had been questioned about the
incident and each reported plaintiffs' child had been
abusive in some manner; (4) plaintiffs' child was
informed that if he had been abusive, he must stop
such behavior immediately; and (5) he was warned
that there were consequences for abusive behavior.
General Education Provisions Act, § 444(a)(4)(A),
as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g(a)(4)(A).
[3] Federal Courts <@^>18
170Bkl8
The district court did not abuse its discretion in
reaching the merits of the state claims after
dismissing plaintiffs' federal claims on the
pleadings, and observing that the plaintiffs' state
claims were not as novel as plaintiffs would paint
them.
[4] Municipal Corporations <@^741.25
268k741.25

Copr. © West 2001 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

3 Fed.Appx. 905
(Cite as: 3 Fed.Appx. 905, 2001 WL 113829 (10th Cir.(Utah)))
Notice-of-claims
provisions
of
the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act apply to all claims
against a governmental entity and its employees,
including claims based on violation of the Utah
Constitution. U.C.A. §§ 63-30-10.5, 63-30-13.
[5] Federal Courts <@^611
170Bk611
Arguments never adequately raised before the
district court would not be considered for the first
time on appeal.
*906 Before MURPHY and ANDERSON, Circuit
Judges, and KANE, District J. [FN**]
FN** Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., District Judge,
United States District Court for the District of
Colorado, sitting by designation.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT [FN*]
FN* This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment
may be cited under the terms and conditions of
10th Cir.R. 36.3.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
**1 After C.J. was suspended from Sharon
Elementary School for engaging in several alleged
incidents of misconduct, his parents, Carl and Judy
Jensen, filed this civil rights action on their own
behalf and on behalf of C.J. (collectively the
"Plaintiffs") against the following entity and four
individuals: Alpine School District; Tom Rabb,
Roy Pehrson, and Kent Pierce, employees of Alpine
School District; and Muffet Reeves, the principal of
Sharon Elementary School (collectively the
"Defendants"). The Plaintiffs' civil rights complaint
alleged the following seven general causes of action:
(1) they were denied procedural due process in
violation of the United States and Utah Constitutions
when C.J. was suspended from school; (2) the
Defendants failed to comply with § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act in dealing with C.J.'s behavioral
problems; (3) the Defendants' actions relating to the
suspension of C.J. denied them equal protection
under both the United States and Utah Constitutions;
(4) the Jensens were denied their right as parents "to
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direct the care and upbringing of their children in
fulfillment of their moral, God- given duty to do so"
in violation of both the United States and Utah
Constitutions; (5) the Defendants infringed C.J.'s
interest in his reputation; (6) the Defendants
violated their privacy rights under the United States
Constitution, the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act ("FERPA"), and the Utah Constitution;
and (7) the Defendants violated their First
Amendment right to petition the government for
redress of grievances.
*907 In response to the Defendants' Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the district court
dismissed the Plaintiffs' complaint in its entirety,
resolving both the federal and state claims on the
merits. On appeal, the Plaintiffs contend as follows:
(1) the district court erred as a matter of law in
ruling that their civil rights complaint failed to state
a claim under the United States Constitution,
Rehabilitation Act, and FERPA; (2) the district
court abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss
their state-law claims without prejudice after
concluding the complaint failed to state a valid
federal claim; and (3) even assuming the district
court acted within its discretion in reaching the
merits of their state-law claims, it erred in
dismissing those claims on the ground that the
Plaintiffs had not filed a timely notice of claim
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11 and 63-3013. This court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and affirms the district court's order
of dismissal.
The district court began its analysis of the
Defendants' motion to dismiss by correctly noting
that it must assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts
alleged in the Plaintiffs' complaint, viewing those
facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the Plaintiffs.
See Dist.Ct.
Memorandum Opinion & Order at 6; see also
Roman v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 542, 543
(10th Cir.1995). Applying that standard, the district
court set forth a thorough recital of the relevant
facts, drawing those essential facts from the wellpleaded allegations in the Plaintiffs' original and
first amended complaints.
See Dist.Ct.
Memorandum Opinion & Order at 2-6. Because this
court's de novo review of the Plaintiffs' amended
complaint reveals that the district court's rendition
of the facts is both thorough and accurate, and
because neither party on appeal objects to the district
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court's statement of the facts, this court need not
restate the relevant facts.
**2 The district court began by addressing each of
the Plaintiffs' numerous federal claims. As noted by
the district court, the Plaintiffs' federal due process
claims arise out of the events surroundings C.J.'s
ten-day suspension. In particular, the Plaintiffs
argue that they were denied due process with regard
to the manner in which Reeves investigated and
handled the suspension. They further argue that the
post-suspension hearing was not in conformity with
Alpine School District policy. As to Plaintiffs'
claims regarding the processes utilized by Reeves in
investigating and handling C.J.'s suspension, the
district court concluded those processes afforded
C.J. the rudimentary precautions against unfair or
mistaken findings of misconduct as required by Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42
L.Ed.2d 725 (1975). With regard to the postsuspension hearing, the district court noted that the
Jensens were given notice of the hearing and an
opportunity to attend. When the Jensens were
unable to attend the hearing, the administrative panel
sent them a tape of the hearing and informed the
Jensens that they could respond in writing or set
another time to reconvene the panel.
These
procedures complied with Alpine School District
policy. Finally, the district court concluded that to
the extent Carl and Judy Jensen were claiming a
violation to their due process rights arising out of
the suspension of C.J., those claims failed because
procedural due process is due to the student facing
suspension, not that student's parents.
As to Plaintiffs' claims arising under the
Rehabilitation Act, the district court noted that
although the Jensens were provided with all the
documents necessary for C.J. to be considered for a
special education placement, including permission
slips, the *908 Jensens never consented to the
placement of C.J. in such a program. Absent such
consent, the Defendants were without authority to
place C.J. in a program providing special education
and related services. Furthermore, the district
rejected as inconsistent with controlling regulations
the Plaintiffs' assertion that their private evaluation
of C.J., which was communicated to C.J.'s
classroom teacher and other school officials in the
process of dealing with and trying to control C.J.'s
behavioral outbursts, constituted consent to special
placement. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.500, 300.504.
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim

The Plaintiffs' amended complaint also alleged that
the Defendants denied C.J. equal protection under
the United States Constitution when they treated him
differently than other similarly situated students. In
finding that this allegation failed to state a claim, the
district court first noted that neither the Plaintiffs'
original nor amended complaints alleged any facts to
support their conclusory allegation that C.J. was
treated differently from similarly situated students.
Furthermore, the Plaintiffs' equal protection claim is
premised on the assumption that C.J. qualified as
disabled under the Rehabilitation Act. The district
court concluded that because the Plaintiffs'
Rehabilitation Act claim failed as set forth above,
their equal protection claim failed on the same
grounds.
**3 The district court concluded the Jensens' claim
that the Defendants had interfered with their right to
direct the care and upbringing of C.J. failed because
the well-pleaded facts in the amended complaint
demonstrated the Defendants' actions were rationally
related to the legitimate state purpose of disciplining
students who violate school rules. See generally San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
44, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973); New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334, 105 S.Ct.
733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). The district court
recognized, however, that the "rational relationship"
test did not apply to the extent the Jensens had
coupled their parental-right claim with a freeexercise-of-religion claim. Nevertheless, other than
broadly stating that the actions of the Defendants
"interfered with their ability to live what they
believe is the best way to fulfill their moral duty to
God regarding C.J. by providing for his social and
moral development" the Plaintiffs' amended
complaint failed to identify any specific religious
belief that was infringed by the Defendants during
the events surrounding the suspension of C.J. Even
assuming, however, that the Jensens had
successfully added a religious component to their
parental-rights claim, the district court concluded the
amended complaint still failed to state a claim.
There was nothing in the complaint to indicate the
actions of the Defendants were based on anything
other than purely secular considerations that were
content neutral and implemented in a reasonable
manner. See Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 882, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876
(1990) ("Respondents urge us to hold, quite simply,
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that when otherwise prohibitable conduct is
accompanied by religious convictions, not only the
convictions but the conduct itself must be free from
governmental regulation. We have never held that,
and decline to do so now.").
As to C.J.'s claim regarding injury to his
reputational interests, the district court simply noted
that something more than mere defamation must be
involved in order to state a federal claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
712, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976).
Because the Defendants provided C.J. all of the
process due during the suspension-decision
proceedings, the fact that other students were aware
of the suspension *909 could not, standing alone as
it did, form the basis of an action for injury to
reputation.
In their first amended complaint, the Plaintiffs
asserted that Reeves violated their right to privacy,
which right arose under the Fourth Amendment, the
Fourteenth Amendment, and FERPA. The district
court concluded that the Plaintiffs' privacy claims
based on the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
failed to state a claim because Reeves' investigation
of the complaints against C.J. was reasonable and
Reeves' suspension decision was made in conformity
with Lopez. The district court concluded that the
Plaintiffs' privacy claims based on FERPA failed to
state a claim because:
(1) Reeves' alleged
disclosure to the parents of children involved as
victims or witnesses did not constitute a prohibited
disclosure of an educational record under 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g; (2) FERPA only regulates the release of
records pursuant to a policy or practice and there
was nothing in the complaint to indicate Reeves'
disclosures were pursuant to such a policy or
practice; and (3) FERPA does not create a private
cause of action enforceable under § 1983.
**4 The district court dismissed the Plaintiffs'
claims relating to their right to petition the
government for redress of grievances, noting that
the chain-of-command comments attributable to the
Defendants, even if they could be construed as
critical of the Jensens' actions in contacting the
Alpine School District Superintendent rather than
Reeves, fell far short of an infringement of the
Jensens' right to petition for redress of grievances.
This court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint de
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim
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novo and will affirm a 12(b)(6) dismissal only if "it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief." Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for
the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th
Cir.1999) (quotations omitted). All well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint are accepted as true and
viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs.
See id. Nevertheless, while this court must accept
reasonable inferences derived from well-pleaded
facts, we need not accept mere conclusions
characterizing pleaded facts or "unwarranted
inferences drawn from the facts or footless
conclusions of law predicated upon them." Bryson
v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1390 (10th
Cir.1990) (quotations omitted).
This court has conducted a de novo review of the
Plaintiffs' original and amended complaints, the
district court's order of dismissal, and the parties'
briefs and contentions on appeal. That review
demonstrates that the district court's order of
dismissal is comprehensive, thorough, and
substantially correct.
Accordingly, with the
exception of the brief comments set out below with
regard to the Plaintiffs' FERPA claims, this court
affirms the district court's 12(b)(6) dismissal of the
Plaintiffs' federal claims for substantially those
reasons set forth in the district court's order of
dismissal filed March 29, 1999.
We recognize that after the district court entered its
order of dismissal this court issued its opinion in
Falvo v. Owasso Independent School District No.
1-001, 233 F.3d 1203 (10th Cir.2000). In Falvo,
this court held that the provisions of FERPA can be
privately enforced through an action brought
pursuant to § 1983. See id. at 1211-13. Based on
Falvo, this court specifically disavows any contrary
conclusion expressed by the district court in
dismissing the Plaintiffs' amended complaint.
Nevertheless, this court concludes that the district
court correctly dismissed the Plaintiffs' FERPA
claims.
*910 [1] The Plaintiffs' complaint identifies two
disclosures that purportedly implicate FERPA's
privacy provisions. The first disclosure occurred on
October 31, 1997, in a memorandum sent by Reeves
to the parents of a female student named L.P.
According to the amended complaint, "[t]he
memorandum outlined what had been done in
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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response to a harassment complaint that had been
filed against C.J. The memorandum indicated that
matters had been investigated in accordance with
district policy and C.J. would lose his lunch
privileges during the first week of November and be
required to stay in the principal's office." Like the
district court, we conclude that the contemporaneous
disclosure to the parents of a victimized child of the
results of any investigation and resulting disciplinary
actions taken against an alleged child perpetrator
does not constitute a release of an "education
record" within the meaning of 20 U.S.C. §
1232g(a)(4)(A). Reading such disclosures to fall
within the ambit of § 1232g would place educators
in an untenable position: they could not adequately
convey to the parents of affected students that
adequate steps were being undertaken to assure the
safety of the student. Nor do we think that such a
targeted, discrete, contemporaneous disclosure fits
within the bounds of the plain language of §
1232g(a)(4)(A). Finally, we note that this particular
disclosure is completely unlike the broad, routinized
disclosures of student grades at issue in Falvo. See
233 F.3d at 1207.
**5 [2] The second disclosure set out in the
Plaintiffs' amended complaint related to a separate
playground incident that allegedly occurred on
March 2, 1999. The amended complaint alleges that
on March 4th, Reeves sent a series of memoranda to
"the parents of students who had claimed they had
been hit or touched by C.J. as well as other students
who had reported were [sic] witnesses to the conduct
of C.J." In both their appellate brief and at oral
argument, the Plaintiffs emphasized that this second
disclosure went not only to the parents of the
children allegedly assaulted by C.J., but also to the
parents of children who simply witnessed the
incident. This court need not decide how a broader,
yet still contemporaneous, disclosure to the parents
of children witnesses, in addition to the parents of
alleged victims, would affect the calculus set out
above because the memoranda identified in the
amended complaint simply do not disclose anything
that could qualify as an education tecord under §
1232g(a)(4)(A). Instead, the memoranda all reflect
the following information: (1) an incident allegedly
occurred on the playground involving C.J. and a
number of other children; (2) C.J. was allegedly
verbally and/or physically abusive to several
children during the incident; (3) each addressee's
child had been questioned about the incident and
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each reported C.J. had been abusive in some
manner; (4) C.J. was informed that if he had been
abusive, he must stop such behavior immediately;
and (5) C.J. was warned that there were
consequences for abusive behavior. As should be
apparent, the memoranda identified in the complaint
disclosed no more than the fact that the addressee's
child had been involved in an alleged incident
involving C.J., either as a victim or witness, and
that the addressee's child had been questioned about
the incident. The memoranda do not disclose
whether C.J. was ultimately found to be at fault,
whether he was punished, or, if so, what that
punishment was. The Plaintiffs have not identified,
and this court has not found, a single case holding
that the extremely limited type of information
conveyed here constitutes an education record under
§ 1232g. Accordingly, this court concludes that the
district court did not *911 err in dismissing the
Plaintiffs' FERPA claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6).
Having concluded that the district court properly
dismissed the Plaintiffs' federal claims, we must
move on to address the propriety of the district
court's decision to address the Plaintiffs' state
claims on the merits. On appeal, the Plaintiffs raise
the following three primary contentions: (1) the
district court abused its discretion in reaching the
merits of their state claims after having dismissed all
federal claims; (2) the district court erred in
concluding that the state claims were barred because
of the Plaintiffs' failure to comply with the noticeof-claim provisions of the Governmental Immunity
Act (the "Act"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11,
63-30-13; and (3) even assuming their failure to file
a notice of claim barred their action for money
damages, their claims for declaratory and equitable
relief were unaffected by the Act's notice-of-claim
provisions.
**6 [3] Citing to this court's opinion in Bauchman
ex rel. Bauchman v. West High School, 132 F.3d
542, 549-50 (10th Cir.1997), the Plaintiffs assert
that the district court erred in reaching the merits of
their state law claims after dismissing their federal
claims on the pleadings. Although Bauchman noted
a general preference in favor of dismissing state
claims without prejudice when federal claims are
dismissed on the pleadings, it noted that district
courts retain discretion to reach the merits of
pendent state claims. See id. at 549. On appeal, this
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court analyzes only whether the district court abused
that discretion. See id. at 550. In this circuit, abuse
of discretion is defined as "an arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable judgment."
Coletti v. Cudd Pressure Control 165 F.3d 767,
777 (10th Cir.1999). Upon review of the record,
keeping in mind those factors identified by the court
in Bauchman, we conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in reaching the merits of the
state claims.
See 132 F.3d at 549 ("Pendent
jurisdiction is exercised on a discretionary basis,
keeping in mind considerations of judicial economy,
convenience and fairness to the litigants."). In
particular, as briefly set forth below, this court
agrees with the district court's resolution of the
Plaintiffs' state claims and with the district court's
observation that the Plaintiffs' state claims are not as
novel as Plaintiffs would paint them.
[4] Under the provisions of the Act, all claims
against a political subdivision and its employees are
barred unless a notice of claim is filed with the
appropriate entity within one year after the claim
against that entity or its employees arises. See Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-13. It is uncontested that the
Plaintiffs never filed a notice of claim. Citing the
Utah Supreme Court's decision in Bott v. DeLand,
922 P.2d 732 (Utah 1996), the Plaintiffs argued
before the district court that because their claims
arose under the Utah Constitution, the Act and its
notice-of-claim provisions did not apply.
In
rejecting this argument, the district court first
recognized that Bott did stand for the proposition
that governmental entities cannot use governmental
immunity to shield themselves from liability for
violations of the Utah Constitution. See id. at 736.
Nevertheless, the district court concluded that Bott
could not be reasonably read for the proposition that
none of the provisions of the Act, including its
purely procedural requirements, apply to claims
arising under the Utah Constitution. Instead, relying
on the plain language of the Act, the district court
concluded that the Act's notice-of- claim provisions
applied to all claims against a governmental entity
and its employees.
See Utah Code Ann. §§
63-30-2(1),-11.
On appeal, the Plaintiffs reassert the same
arguments raised before the district *912 court.
Like the district court, this court does not read Bott
as standing for the broad proposition advanced by
the Plaintiffs. In fact, the court in Bott specifically
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recognized that the legislature could impose rules
and regulations regarding remedies for constitutional
violations, as long as those rules do not
unreasonably impair the constitutional right at issue.
See 922 P.2d at 736. Plaintiffs never asserted
before the district court that the Act's notice-ofclaim provisions constitute an unreasonable
impairment. Furthermore, it is worth noting that
the Act specifically provides that constitutional
claims involving the taking of private property
without just compensation are governed by the Act.
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10.5. This belies the
Plaintiffs' assertion that the Utah legislature never
intended that claims based on the Utah Constitution
be governed by the provisions of the Act.
**7 [5] Finally, Plaintiffs contend that even
assuming their claims for money damages are barred
by their failure to file a notice of claim, the district
court erred in dismissing with prejudice their state
claims for declaratory and equitable relief. See id. §
63-30-2(1) (defining claim for purposes of the Act
as "any claim or cause of action for money or
damages"); id. § 63-30-13 ("A claim against a
political subdivision, or against its employees for an
act or omission occurring during the performance of
the employee's duties ... is barred unless notice of
claim is filed with the governing body of the
political subdivision ... within one year after the
claim arises." (emphasis added)). This court has
scoured the appellate record and concludes that this
argument was never advanced before the district
court. The Plaintiffs' filings before the district court
only vaguely reference the fact that their state claims
contained equitable and declaratory elements. Those
filings, however, never indicated any specific legal
basis for treating the equitable claims differently
from the damages claims. Because the Plaintiffs
failed to adequately raise this argument before the
district court, we will not consider the question for
the first time on appeal. See Walker v. Mather (In
re Walker), 959 F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir.1992).
[FN1]
FN1. We reach the same resolution as to the
Plaintiffs' claims that (1) C.J.'s time for filing a
notice of appeal has not expired because of his
minority and (2) the district court should have
liberally read their complaint as stating a claim that
the individual employees acted in a fraudulent or
malicious fashion thereby obviating the need to file
a notice of claim. Because these arguments were
not raised before the district court, this court will
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not consider them on appeal.
The judgment of the United States District Court
for the District of Utah dismissing the Plaintiffs'
claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is hereby
AFFIRMED.
END OF DOCUMENT
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